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 Human Capital as an Asset Class




This paper derives the value and the risk of aggregate human capital in a dynamic
equilibrium production model with Due-Epstein preferences. In this setting the ex-
pected return of a risky asset is a function of the asset's covariance with consumption
growth and a weighted average of the asset's covariance with aggregate wage growth
and aggregate nancial returns. A calibration of the model matching the historical
ratio of wages to consumption in the United States (85% between 1950 and 2007)
suggests that the weight of human capital in aggregate wealth is 87%. The results of
the calibration follow from the relative size of wages and dividends in the economy
and the dynamics of the ratio of wages to consumption, which are counter-cyclical.
As a result, human capital is less risky than equity, implying that the risk premium
of human capital is lower than that of equity.
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11 Introduction
Wages constitute more than 80% of consumption and about 60% of gross domestic prod-
uct in the United States.1 Indeed, the present value of future wages { human capital {
represents the largest share of wealth in the economy and therefore must aect portfolio
choice decisions and asset prices. Furthermore, wages are the main corporate expenditure.
As a result, rms have a large exposure to shocks that aect the aggregate level of wages,
which aects the riskiness of cash ows and investing decisions. To take into account hu-
man capital, researchers need to make assumptions about its share of aggregate wealth
and expected returns, but they often do it without a solid theoretical background. This
paper provides a benchmark model, rooted in a traditional dynamic stochastic equilibrium
model, through which one can analyze the drivers of human capital's value and risk.
Human capital poses a challenge for researchers because even though it is the largest
single asset class in the economy, we cannot observe its value or dynamics directly; we
merely observe wages, human capital's dividends. Thus, we need a framework to deter-
mine human capital's value. I use a continuous-time version of the one-sector stochastic
growth model to derive the endogenous dynamics of consumption, wages, dividends, and
the stochastic discount factor. I then use these dynamics to determine the value and the
risk characteristics of human capital and equity.
The unobservability of human capital became less of an issue, at least for under-
standing its impact on asset prices, after Lucas' (1978) and Breeden's (1979) seminal
contributions. If human capital had any role, it would be captured entirely by its impact
on consumption's conditional growth and volatility; shocks to consumption would therefore
be enough to determine the stochastic discount factor, and with it any asset's price and
riskiness. However, once one departs from standard constant relative risk aversion (CRRA)
preferences, the stochastic discount factor is not driven entirely by contemporaneous con-
sumption shocks, but also on changes in the expected dynamics of consumption. Epstein
1Using data from the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) tables between 1947 and 2007, the
average ratio of total compensation to consumption was 85%, and the average ratio of total compensation
to production was 58%.
2and Zin (1989) show that, in the special case of Kreps-Proteus (1978) preferences, shocks
to consumption and shocks to aggregate wealth drive the stochastic discount factor. Since
human capital is the largest component of aggregate wealth, not observing it continues
being a problem.
Previous work exploring production economies and asset prices has not asked what
the value of human capital or its riskiness is. To calculate the value of human capital the
relative size of its dividend{wages{must be properly calibrated to the observed relative
size of wages and consumption. Thus, I calibrate the model to match the long-term ratio
of wages to consumption, consumption growth and consumption volatility. With this
calibration the relative magnitude of the \dividends" paid by human capital and equity,
their growth and volatility, will resemble those observed historically in the United States.
What I present below are the results of that calibration.
This paper shows that under a plausible set of assumptions, we should expect human
capital to be less risky than stocks. While empirical evidence is consistent with this nding
(dividend growth exhibits a volatility of 10%, whereas aggregate wage growth volatility is
about 2.2%),2 the empirical literature does not provide an explanation for why wages are
less volatile than dividends nor why wages perform relatively better than dividends during
downturns.3 Existing theoretical studies justify this behavior for wages and dividends by
pointing out that labor contracts insure workers against idiosyncratic risk and by assuming
that workers have less tolerance for risk.4 The model I present here shows that one does
not need to rely on idiosyncratic labor shocks or on ad hoc assumptions about the risk
aversion of investors and workers to explain why wages are less volatile than dividends.
The intuition for the result that human capital is less risky than equity is as follows.
The value of aggregate wealth, dened here as the present value of all future consumption,
varies over time as technology and capital shocks aect the productivity of capital and
2See Campbell and Cochrane (1999) who use 11.2%. Wage data comes from \total compensation", as
reported in the NIPA tables, between 1947 and 2007.
3See Lustig, Van Nieuwerburgh and Verdelhan (2009).
4See Harris and H olmstrom (1982).
3labor. For example, a shock that makes capital more productive in the future increases
aggregate wealth, even though the stock of capital did not change. In the absence of
frictions that make adjustments to capital costly, the value of shares on rms equal the
capital stock, so the change in aggregate wealth must be absorbed by the only other claim
to production: human capital. At the same time, an increase in the productivity of capital
results in marginal utility being relatively higher than what it will be in the future since
consumption will grow faster than on average. Thus, human capital becomes a larger part
of aggregate wealth when marginal utility is relatively high, making it a \safer" investment
than equity.
Another way of understanding the result is to note that the ratio of wages to consump-
tion is counter-cyclical, implying that wages are relatively high when marginal utility is
also high. The result holds as long as the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is positive
but the intuition is best understood using the special case of a myopic representative agent
with an intertemporal elasticity of substitution of one. In this case, the agent does not
adjust the ow of consumption per unit of wealth. In the presence of decreasing returns to
scale for capital, times when capital is relatively abundant are also times in which expected
returns to wealth are low. Thus, by not adjusting consumption, the myopic agent induces a
time-varying ratio of expected wealth returns to consumption. Moreover, expected wealth
returns to consumption are counter-cyclical since capital is relatively abundant in \good
times". To tie this eect to the riskiness of human capital, recall that in a competitive
equilibrium with a Cobb-Douglas production function aggregate wages are proportional to
gross returns to capital, which in turn move with expected wealth returns. In times of
relatively abundant capital, gross capital returns are relatively low, and therefore the ratio
of wages to consumption is also relatively low. The same logic applies to the case in which
capital is relatively scarce. In that case wealth's returns and the competitive wage rate are
relatively high, but the myopic agent does not adjust the fraction of wealth he consumes.
Thus, in bad times the ratio of wages to consumption increases. Overall, wages do not fall
as fast as consumption in \bad times" and do not grow as fast as consumption in \good
4times", acting as a hedge.
The result that human capital is less risky than equity means that we should apply a
lower discount rate to it. As a result, the weight of human capital in the aggregate wealth
portfolio should be, on average, at least as high as the fraction of wages to consumption
observed in the data. This nding suggests that a weight for human capital closer to 87%
seems more appropriate than a weight of around 70%, which is common in the literature.5
Recent empirical work reaches a similar conclusion, estimating the weight of human capital
in aggregate wealth to be more than 90%.6 The result is relevant for the portfolio choice
literature because the weight and risk of human capital aect an agent's optimal portfolio.
The model also makes transparent how human capital has an eect on asset-pricing.
Due-Epstein preferences imply that, in addition to consumption growth, capital returns
and wage growth drive the diusion of the stochastic discount factor. Thus, any asset's risk
premium will depend on the covariance of its returns with capital returns (nancial wealth
in this model) and wage growth. This result is consistent with empirical ndings, such
as Jaganathan and Wang's (1996). But information about the state of the economy, for
example the ratio of wages to consumption, also aects the sensitivity of the asset to capital
returns and wage growth, justifying the use of wages as a conditioning variable (Lettau
and Ludvigson (2001a and 2001b), Santos and Veronesi (2006), and Julliard (2007) among
others). This work has had some success explaining the cross-section of asset returns,
as well as future market returns. Even though previous work nds small evidence of co-
movement between human capital and asset returns (Fama and Schwert (1977), Heaton and
Lucas (1996), and Davis and Willen (2000)), its dual role as a factor and as a conditioning
variable appears to be important for explaining asset returns.
The use of Due-Epstein preferences allows me to calibrate reasonable values for the
risk-free rate an the equity premium, but does not drive the main result: if wages are a
larger fraction of consumption when marginal utility is high, then human capital is less
5For example, see Baxter and Jermann (1997) and Chen et al. (2008).
6See Lustig, Van Niewerburgh and Verdelhan (2009).
5risky than equity; if human capital pays, on average, 85% of consumption and its risk is
lower than that of equity then human capital's weight in the aggregate wealth portfolio
should not be, on average, less than 85%.
The structure of the rest of the article is as follows. Section 2 relates this paper to the
existing literature. Section 3 presents the model with an innitely-lived agent and derives
the dynamics of the general equilibrium. Section 4 discusses the main implications from
the model, and Section 5 analyzes the numerical calibration.
2 Relation to existing literature
The literature that originally tackled the impact of human capital on asset prices started
from assumptions about the exogenous wage process (Mayers (1972)). Fama and Schwert
(1977) tested the empirical predictions of Mayers' model and concluded that human capital,
as proxied by wages, did not play a major role in determining asset prices.
More recent work, recognizing the weakness of treating wages as a proxy for human
capital, tries to include human capital as relevant for determining other assets' prices. The
two main characteristics of human capital that matter most for asset-pricing are its weight
in the aggregate wealth portfolio and its riskiness.
The weight of human capital in the aggregate wealth portfolio is either assumed
exogenously or derived endogenously under a restricted set of assumptions. Estimates of
this weight typically range between 60% and 80%, all lower than the estimate presented here
(Baxter and Jermann (1997), Lettau and Ludvigson (2001), Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh
(2006), Chen et al.(2008)). Two empirical papers that support higher values for the fraction
of human capital in aggregate wealth are Jorgenson and Fraumeni (1989) and Lustig, Van
Nieuwerburgh and Verdelhan (2010). This paper nds similar results, while highlighting
the mechanism that drives them.
The riskiness of human capital is comprised of idiosyncratic and systematic compo-
nents. In my model I ignore idiosyncratic shocks, so systematic risk is the sole determinant
6of human capital's expected returns. Empirical studies require assumptions about human
capital's expected returns. Shiller (1995) assumes that human capital's expected returns
are constant. Campbell (1996) assumes that its expected returns are conditioned to be
the same as those of stocks, while Jagannathan and Wang (1996) assume human capital's
return is equal to labor income growth. Palacios-Huerta (2003a) uses the increase in labor
income attributed to an extra year of education as a proxy for human capital returns and
Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh (2006) assume it to be the return that minimizes pricing er-
rors in their model.7 The model presented here provides theoretical foundations to evaluate
these assumptions. In particular, human capital's expected returns appear to be smaller
than those of stocks, and innovations to expected returns of human capital and equity are
negatively correlated.
Human capital is not only important on an aggregate level for asset-prices, but also
important for portfolio choice. The portfolio choice literature assumes exogenous wage dy-
namics (for example, Merton (1971), Svensson (1988), Koo (1998), Campbell and Viceira
(1999), and Viceira (2001)), but in that work wages and asset prices can diverge unrealis-
tically. Benzoni, Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2007) provide a solution to this problem
by assuming cointegration between wages and nancial markets. However, the process
driving the cointegration is also exogenous. In contrast, my model delivers cointegration
endogenously, providing an intuitive reason for why wages and dividends follow a trend
over time.
The model is grounded in the traditional one-sector stochastic growth literature.8
This literature goes back at least to Ramsey (1928) and the stochastic versions of Mirrlees
(1967), Brock and Birman (1972) and Merton (1975). Subsequent work tried to bridge
macroeconomic observations with asset prices in an attempt to address the shortcomings
pointed out by Mehra and Prescott (1985) on the predictions of Rubinstein (1976), Lucas
7Palacios-Huerta (2003b) uses the same method to compare the returns to investing in education of
dierent demographic groups.
8A general closed-form solution to the growth model is not known, though solutions do exist restricting
the parameters (Smith (2007)). The restrictions are not useful to obtain reasonable results, so I proceed
with a numerical solution.
7(1978) and Breeden's (1979) consumption-based model.9 Importantly, none of these papers
explored the implications for the value and expected return of human capital.
The paper also links to more recent work that explores the asset pricing implica-
tions of having multiple sources of income that add up to aggregate consumption, as in
Cochrane, Longsta and Santa Clara (2006), Ba sak (1999), Gomes et al.(2007), G^ arleanu
and Panageas (2008), and Santos and Veronesi (2006). In contrast to this work, I allow for
capital accumulation, addressing the link between capital growth, production shocks, and
human capital returns.
The implications for asset prices derived from the model follow empirical observations
linking price-dividend ratios, forecasted economic growth, and asset returns (Fama and
French (1989), Fama (1990), Lamont (1998), Lettau and Ludvigson (2001a and 2001b)
and Santos and Veronesi (2006)). The theoretical model I present here is a step towards
understanding the dynamics observed in the data.
3 Model description
This section describes and solves the equilibrium model, characterizes the representative
agent's optimal consumption decision, and derives joint dynamics for wages and dividends.
3.1 Economic environment
Consider a competitive, continuous-time economy with a continuum of identical agents,
whose mass is normalized to 1, and a continuum of identical rms. Each agent works
and chooses to invest her wealth Wj optimally among the existing rms. Agents can trade
claims that span all possible outcomes in the economy, and therefore markets are complete.
We are interested in three of these claims. The rst claim is \human capital," and it is
dened as a security that pays aggregate wages. The second claim is \equity," and it
9See Brock (1982), Cochrane (1991, 1996), Belo (2007), Rouwenhorst (1995), Jermann (1998), Boldrin,
Christiano and Fisher (2001), Danthine and Donaldson (1992 and 2002).
8consists of a claim to aggregate dividends. The last claim is an instantaneously risk-free
bond.
3.2 Production and prots
The single productive technology produces a single consumption good. At any point in
time, the agent can consume the good or invest it in any of the rms. Capital investment
is perfectly reversible, so changes in its stock are costless. Output at each point in time
depends on the amount of aggregate capital, labor, the technology level and production
shocks. Denote by (
;=;P) a xed complete probability state, and the stochastic process
(Bt)t>0, a standard 2-dimensional Brownian motion with respect to the ltration (Ft). The
rst element of the Brownian motion will be denoted by dBA and the second by dBK. The
correlation between the shocks is 'K;A. The Brownian motion reects shocks to technology
and output as described below.
I denote the technological level by At, which follows a geometric brownian motion:
dAt = Atdt + AtAdBA; (1)
where  is the growth rate of the technology level. Under this specication, shocks to the
technology level are permanent.
The dynamics of rm j's capital are given by:
dKt;j = Kt;j(Z(Kt;j;Lt;j;At)   ytLt;j      dt;j)dt + KKt;jdBK;t (2)
where Z() is output per unit of capital, yt is the wage rate per unit of capital,  is the
depreciation rate, dt;j are dividend payments per unit of capital, and K is the volatility
associated with the stochastic component of output.10 Output per unit of capital has
10This specication results from output following the following stochastic process:
Kt;jZ(Kt;j;Lt;j;At)dt + Kt;jKdBK;t: (3)
A rm's accumulation of capital is simply its output minus wages paid, depreciation, and dividends
9a deterministic component Z(Kt;Lt;At), and a stochastic one KdBK;t. The stochastic
component of output can be interpreted in several ways. Output can be lower than expected
due to a transient fall in the technology level. If we interpret the weather as part of what
we call \technology", then unexpectedly poor weather leads to lower than expected output.
Output can also be lower than expected due to an unforseen problem with capital itself,
for example, if a machine breaks down. Alternatively, the dBK;t shocks can be interpreted
as coming from a stochastic depreciation process. If K = 0, then the technology is
instantaneously riskless and equity's return will equal the risk-free rate. The evolution of
technology is exogenous, and its shocks capture uncertainty in the rate at which it evolves.
This production specication is exible, allowing for a stochastic component of production
technological improvement.
The literature concentrates on specications for output that are continuous, dieren-






The choice of making the technology labor-augmenting instead of Hicks-neutral or capital-
augmenting does not aect the main results, but it aects the interpretation of the coe-
cients of At. The particular assumption for the production technology does impact wage
and dividend dynamics, as dierent specications for Z(Kt;Lt;At) result in dierent shares
of output being paid to labor and capital. The specication presented here should be in-
terpreted as a benchmark case, with richer structures possible when the shares of output
that go to labor and capital change over time.
I assume individuals have no disutility from working, so they do not face a work-
returned to investors. It is perhaps more natural to use output shocks proportional to the output level, or
proportional to the impact that At has on output, instead of shocks proportional to capital. The choice
presented here is a simplication that keeps the instantaneous variance of capital constant. The alternative
specication leads to stochastic volatility which adds one more layer of complexity to the results and makes
the numerical results less stable, without necessarily adding interesting insights.
10leisure tradeo.
3.3 Firms
Firms are run by managers who maximize the present value of the rm by maximizing the
expected present value of dividends. Managers choose how much labor to hire at every
point in time and how much capital to return to investors as dividends, or how much equity
to raise for investment. Managers take as given the dynamics of wages and the stochastic
discount factor. Following the previous discussion, denoting Ms as the stochastic discount











s:t: dKt;j = Kt;j(Z(Kt;j;Lt;j;At)   ytLt;j      dt;j)dt + KKt;jdBt: (6)
3.4 The Representative Agent
I assume the agent maximizes his lifetime value of consumption with Due-Epstein recur-
sive utility over an innite horizon. Because there are only two sources of uncertainty (dBA
and dBK), equity, human capital, and a risk-free bond will span all possible contingent
claims. Without loss of generality, I assume the representative agent only trades these







s:t: dWt = (Wt(xt
0(rt   rf;t) + 1
0rf;t)   Ct)dt + Wtxt
0rdB;









    1); (8)
11Wt is an agent's wealth, xt is the vector with the fraction of wealth invested in equity,
human capital, and the risk-free rate, rt is the vector of expected returns to equity and
human capital, 1 is a vector of ones, and r is the covariance matrix of asset return volatility
associated with the dBA and dBK shocks.
This specication is the continuous-time equivalent of Epstein-Zin preferences (see
Epstein and Zin, 1989, and Kreps and Porteus, 1978). The advantage of using Due-
Epstein preferences is that the elasticity of intertemporal substitution and the coecient
of relative risk aversion can vary independently of each other. With CRRA preferences
(which in the present setting are the special case of  = 1= ) an increase in relative
risk aversion necessarily implies a decrease in the elasticity of intertemporal substitution.
Risk-aversion and intertemporal substitution are dierent concepts, and Due-Epstein
preferences give us the exibility to treat them as such. The extra degree of freedom
provided by an independent elasticity of intertemporal substitution has been shown to
improve the calibration of equilibrium models (see Banzal and Yaron, 2004), in particular
a low risk-free rate and a high equity premium.
3.5 Equilibrium
This section denes and proceeds to characterize the equilibrium in this economy. In
equilibrium, the supply of capital by agents equals the demand of capital by rms. This
condition is equivalent to agents consuming all their income from dividends and wages
(a \no free-disposal" condition). lastly, the value of capital held far away in the future
converges to zero (the \transversality" condition).
3.5.1 Denition
Capital and labor markets must clear in equilibrium. The denition that follows is stan-
dard:
Denition 1 In this economy, an equilibrium is dened as a stochastic path for
12fKt;Lt;At;dt;xt;r;t;rt;Ct;yt;Mtg1
t such that, for every t,
1. Given the processes for fyt, At, Kt, Mtg, each rm chooses Lt and dt to maximize
the present value of dividends (Equation (5)).
2. Given the processes for fKt,xt;r;t;rt;ytg, the agent chooses Ct and xt to maximize
his expected lifelong utility.
3. Capital markets clear, which implies consumption equals wages plus dividends: Ct =
Kt(yt + dt):
4. Labor markets clear: Lt = 1.
3.5.2 Capital Dynamics
Capital dynamics will be the result of managers optimally choosing the capital and labor
required for production over time. Throughout the remaining portion of the paper it will







Given the production function, Zt is output per unit of capital. As I show below, output per
unit of capital is the only state variable in the economy. Yet, for mathematical convenience,





noting that output per unit of capital is e(1 )zt. Applying the It^ o-Doeblin Lemma to zt















The instantaneous variance of Zt drives many results in the paper so it is useful to dene
it here. Denoting 







K   2AK'K;A: (13)
When output per unit of capital, Zt, is very small, consumption dominates any amount
produced (0 when zt ! 0), and the drift of zt is positive. On the other hand, as zt grows
consumption does not grow as much, since the agent faces a higher opportunity cost of
consuming. Thus, for large values of zt, its drift is negative. As a result, zt is mean-
reverting. Since zt is the only state variable, all the relevant quantities in the model { the
risk-free rate, the equity premium, the ratio of wages to consumption, and the dividend
price ratio { are mean reverting as well.
3.5.3 Optimization solution
The manager's optimization problem can be solved using the standard dynamic program-
ming procedure as in Merton (1973). The manager's value function will depend on the
rm's capital at time t, Kj;t, aggregate capital in the economy Kt, time, and technology
eciency At. Let J(Kj;t;Kt;t;At) be the solution of the manager's Bellman equation. The
following proposition characterizes the solution of the manager's and representative agent's
optimization problem:11
Proposition 1 Assume   > 0,   6= 1,  > 0 and  6= 1, if the value function J(Kj;t;Kt;t;At)
11 Note that wages do not enter into the Jacobian as on aggregate these depend completely on changes
to technology and the capital stock (this result is derived in the appendix), and thus we only need to
include At. If technology was irreversible, or if wages were subject to frictions, then the level of these
variables would be needed here.
14exists and is twice continuously dierentiable, then the manager's value function can be ex-
pressed as:
 J(Kj;t;Kt;t;At) = J(Kj;t;zt)
 J(Kj;t;zt) = Kj;tm(zt)
 m(zt) = g(zt)  
g0(zt)
1 
 g(zt) solves the following ODE:
0 = g(z)(1   )

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with g(1) = 0 and g0(1) = 0 as boundary conditions.











m(zt)  : (15)
Proof: See Appendix.
The boundary conditions follow from the agent choosing to consume more when
output per unit of capital increases. As output per unit of capital becomes arbitrarily
large, the marginal utility approaches zero, implying that g(z) approaches zero for large
values of z.
Equation (15) is a generalization of the CRRA result that relates the stochastic
discount factor with consumption. When  = 1=, the function g(zt) dissappears and
consumption becomes only a function of constants and the stochastic discount factor. In
the more general setting with Due-Epstein preferences g(zt) enters into the equation
and introduces an additional component linking consumption and the stochastic discount
15factor. As a result, the risk-free rate and the market price of risk will not be characterized
any more by consumption growth alone.
3.6 Dynamics of the economy
Having determined the optimal rule for choosing between consumption and saving, we
now analyze the dynamics of the economy. The optimal consumption rule will determine
the dynamics of consumption and the stochastic discount factor, which determines the
risk-free rate. The optimal consumption rule in conjunction with the marginal product of
labor determines the dynamics of wages and dividends, which in turn determine the value
of equity and human capital. Once we determine the value of equity and human capital,
we can study the equity premium and the co-movement between asset returns and human
capital. I derive all these results in this section.
3.6.1 The stochastic discount factor, and the risk-free rate







+ fV(C;V )dt: (16)
We nd the dynamics of the stochastic discount factor applying It^ o to the expres-
sion in equation (16). Before presenting the result, the following corollary is helpful in
simplifying the expressions that follow.
Corollary 1 m(zt) satises the following ODE:
0 = m(z)

(1   ) 
1    
 
1    
1    
g(z)
 1c(z)m(z) + e































16with m(1) = 0 and m0(1) = 0.
Proof: See appendix.























K   KA'K;A): (19)
To make the analysis that follows clearer, we can nd the dynamics of consumption
and compare them to the dynamics of the stochastic discount factor. In particular, we
can compare the diusion terms of consumption and the stochastic discount factor. Using
equations (14), (15), and (58), and substituting, the volatility of the diusion term of the
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where A;c and K;c denote the instantaneous volatility of consumption due to shocks to
At and Kt, respectively.
Equation (20) implies that the market price of risk, given by the volatility of the
stochastic discount factor, will not only be driven by the volatility of consumption as in the
CRRA case, but will depend on two additional components. The rst one,

1
    

(0;K)0,
is volatility in the stochastic discount factor due to capital's volatility, which, as is shown
later, is also the volatility of equity. Thus, the market price of risk depends on the volatility




g(zt) (A; K)0, is volatility in the stochastic
discount factor due to volatility in capital's productivity Zt. Below I show that this term
17can be expressed as a function of shocks to aggregate wages. In the special case of CRRA
preferences, 1
  = , the last two components of volatility in the stochastic discount factor
become 0, leaving us with the benchmark case of the Consumption CAPM.
The additional components in the volatility of the stochastic discount factor are
closely related to results found in Due and Epstein (1992) and Bansal and Yaron (2004).
These authors note that Due-Epstein preferences (Epstein-Zin in the case of Bansal and
Yaron), imply that the stochastic discount factor's volatility depends on consumption's
volatility and aggregate wealth's volatility. Equation (20) shows the same result, with the
additional structure imposed by the production model.
The risk-free rate is the negative of the stochastic discount factor's drift. Rearranging
terms, rf will be given by:
rf;t = e







K   KA'K;A): (21)
Equation (21) states that the risk-free rate is the expected return on physical capital
adjusted by capital's risk premium. Unlike the CRRA case, the risk-free rate will not be a
simple function of consumption growth.
3.6.2 Wages, human capital, and equity
Given the dynamics of the stochastic discount factor, we can now turn our attention to
wages and the value of equity. Wages can be found using the manager's rst order condition
with respect to labor. In this economy, competition between rms ensures that wages equal
the marginal product of labor. For the Cobb-Douglas case this implies that wages per unit
of capital will be:12
yt = (1   )e
(1 )zt: (22)
The value of a claim to aggregate human capital is the present value of the dividend
12This result is derived in Appendix B.











The value of equity equals the present value of net dividends, which can be nega-
tive. This is the case when capital needs to be raised (i.e., when the dierence between
production and the sum of investment and wages is negative.
Following the previous paragraph, and using the fact that in equilibrium dividends
and wages add up to consumption, net dividends per unit of capital will be:
dt = c(zt)   e
(1 )zt(1   ); (24)











Given this information, we can derive the dynamics of human capital and equity using the
stochastic dierential equations implied by their denition as the present value of wages
and dividends, and by the fact that the state of the economy is captured by the level of
capital and zt. The following proposition summarizes this result:13
Proposition 2 Let H(Kt;zt) denote the value of a claim to human capital, 1 = A
m0(z)
m(z)






. Then the value of human capital will be characterized by
 H(Kt;zt) = Kth(zt).
 h(zt) is given by the solution to the following ODE:
0 = (1   )e
(1 )z + h(z)(K(z)   rf(z) + K(2 + 1'K;A)) (26)
13A more frequent method is using the condition that under the risk-neutral measure, the expected
return of a claim to equity cum dividend must equal the risk-free rate. This is, of course, equivalent to
















subject to: h( 1) = 0 and h0( 1) = 0.
 The value of equity will be given by St = Kt.
Proof: See Appendix.
The boundary conditions in Proposition 2 follow from wages approaching zero in
equilibrium as output per unit of capital approaches zero. Dividends do not approach
zero, since the agent still chooses to consume some of his capital. Therefore, a claim to
equity will have value when z ! 1, but a claim to human capital will not.
Given h(zt) and St, it is trivial to calculate the weight of human capital in the





4 Human capital and the equity risk premium
Having derived the dynamics of the economy, in particular the stochastic discount factor
and the claims of human capital and equity, I explore the implications of those dynamics
for the expected returns for both claims. Several papers make assumptions about the value
and expected returns to human capital with the purpose of estimating the return to the
aggregate, human capital-inclusive, wealth portfolio. For that purpose Jagannathan and
Wang (1996) assume that the realized human capital return is equal to wage growth while
Campbell (1996) assumes that expected human capital returns are identical to expected
asset returns. We can compare these assumptions to what the model predicts.
In equilibrium, expected excess returns to any claim are equal to the negative of the
20covariance between the stochastic discount factor and the claim's returns. We can use
this result to express any claim's expected excess return as a function of the state of the
economy. Using Equation (58) and Equation (20), claim S's risk premium is:






































Noticing that cov(dZ; dS
S ) = 1
1 (cov(dY
Y ; dS
S )   cov(dK
K ; dS








the excess return of claim S can be reexpressed as:


































where wy;t = 1
(1 )(1 )
g0(zt)
g(zt) . Equation (29) separates the risk-premium into two compo-
nents. The rst one corresponds to the standard CRRA result (with  = 1
 ) relating the
risk premium to the covariance of the value of a claim with consumption, scaled by the
inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. The second term is only relevant
when  6= 1
 , that is, when the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and the coecient of
relative risk aversion are not linked through only one parameter as with CRRA preferences.
The second term can be interpreted in light of the growing long-run risk literature.
Long-run risk is captured in aggregate wealth returns, which in turn are a function of
nancial returns and wage growth. The second term in equation (29) is the weighted
average of two components, the covariance of an asset with aggregate wage growth and the
covariance of an asset with nancial returns.
Equation (29) predicts that nancial returns and wage growth will explain the cross-
section of stock returns, after controlling for consumption growth. It also shows that the
relationship will be conditional, as both the weight assigned to wage growth, wy;t, and
the covariance between wage growth and asset returns, changes over time. Equation (29)
21predicts that empirical tests of the Consumption CAPM, and the CAPM, that use wage
growth, either directly in the regression (as in Jagannathan and Wang (1996)), or as a
conditioning variable (Lettau and Ludvigson, 2001b), will better explain the cross-section
of asset returns, even though neither the Consumption CAPM nor the CAPM hold in this
setting.
Moving forward to the calibration of the model, for the special case of a claim to
aggregate dividends, equation (28) can be simplied to:
















Equation (30) shows that the market's equity premium is simply a function of the volatility
of capital shocks, risk aversion, and the discount factor's (per unit of capital) sensitivity
to changes in capital's productivity,
m0(z)
m(z) . The equity risk-premium's expression is only
indirectly a function of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, though it is an explicit
function of the volatility of capital shocks and risk-aversion.
The expression for human capital's risk-premium simplies to:


























The return to human capital has two components. The rst follows from human capital's
correlation with the return on nancial wealth, mitigated by the changes in production per
unit of capital. This component is due to human capital's value being a linear function of
the capital's stock; shocks to capital translate into shocks to the value of human capital.
The shocks are mitigated by the fact that the value of the claim per unit of capital,
h(zt), changes over time. The second component explaining the excess return on human
capital stem from the impact that changes in production per unit of capital has on the way
consumption is shared between dividends and wages. The numerical results shown below
suggest this component is negative, reducing human capital's riskiness.
It is useful now to contrast the previous results with the returns to a claim to aggregate
22consumption. Recalling that the value of equity per unit of capital is one, and that the
value of a claim to consumption equals the sum of claims to human capital and equity, the
excess return for this claim will be given by:



























Not surprisingly, the excess returns earned by consumption are larger than those earned
by human capital but smaller than the excess returns to equity. Larger returns to equity
can be achieved, in the presence of smooth consumption, through a process that prices
human capital with lower returns than consumption. In other words, since consumption
equals the sum of wages and dividends, if wages are less risky than consumption then
dividends, through a \leverage" eect, must command a higher return premium. Research
that includes labor income and attempts to calibrate asset-prices shares this result, though
it typically does not make it explicit.
Equations (30) and (31) illuminate the dierences between previous researcher con-
clusions about the returns to human capital. Baxter and Jermann (1997) do not dene the
claims to equity and human capital as I have here, and implicitly assume that h0(zt) = 0.
With this assumption, the returns to human capital and to equity are identical, and per-
fectly cointegrated. Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh's (2006) results, however, imply that
h0(zt) > 0, so that innovations to equity returns have a negative covariance with innovations
to human capital returns.
The relationship between wages and consumption determines the equity premium and
the human capital premium. Whenever a negative shock hits the economy, consumption
falls from its planned path and marginal utility increases. But wages do not fall us much as
consumption or dividends, so the value of the stream of wages is relatively more valuable
than the stream of dividends. The opposite is true after a positive shock, since marginal
utility falls at the same time that dividends increase more than wages. The extra increase
23in dividends is not as valuable to the agent because dividend growth happens precisely
when he values it less.
Finding the expected returns to equity and human capital allows us to answer the
question: is human capital a bond or a stock? The calibrated model provides plausible
answers. Now we can analyze these results using plausible parameters to evaluate what
the model predicts about the variables described above. The results are discussed below.
4.1 The covariance of human capital and equity returns
Previous work (Jagannathan and Wang (1996)) used labor income growth as a proxy for
human capital returns. Using this proxy they proceeded to test asset-pricing models and
conclude that, given labor income growth's low covariance with equity returns, the impact
that human capital has on asset-prices is small. This section studies the relationship
between the covariance of labor income growth and stock returns and the covariance of
human capital and stock returns to shed light on the relationship between each other.
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Thus, the implications from the model is that the covariance between human capital and
equity returns can be quite dierent than the covariance between labor income growth and
equity returns. Given the common assumption of  ' :33, if
h0(zt)
h(zt) ' :67, then both the
covariance of equity and human capital, and the covariance of equity and wages, would
be similar. But the calibrated model suggests that this is not the case. The covariance
between human capital and equity seems to be two or three times larger than the covariance
24between wage growth and equity.
The intuition for this result follows from the dynamics of the model. A positive shock
leads to higher equity value and higher wages, implying a positive covariance between
equity and wage growth. But wage growth is dampened relative to equity's return because
following the positive shock wages are a smaller fraction of consumption. The return
to human capital captures the fact that eventually wages will catch up dividends, so its
covariance with equity is larger. In other words, returns to human capital capitalize wage
growth, making human capital potentially more sensitive to the macro-economy.
5 Model calibration and results
We now study the behavior of the variables of interest in the model. In the analysis that
follows, I will study the risk-free rate, the equity premium, the volatility of consumption
and equity, the weight of human capital in the aggregate wealth portfolio and human
capital's expected excess return.
5.1 Parameter choice
Table 1 shows the parameters I used to calibrate the model. I chose the parameters
so that the model's long-term expected values match consumption growth, consumption
volatility, production volatility, Sharpe ratios, the risk-free rate, and the ratio of wages to
consumption observed in the data.
The technology's growth rate  determines consumption's long term growth. Thus
I set  at 1.7% to match long-term consumption growth. The subjective discount rate 
of 2% is consistent with other studies. The volatility in total factor productivity's growth
rate, A, is 2.5%. This value is consistent with the real business cycle literature, but I use
it as a free parameter to help match the observed ratio of wages to consumption in the
data. Capital's volatility, K, poses a dilemma. On the one hand, in this model capital's
volatility will also be equity's volatility. On the other hand, capital's volatility determines
25production volatility. Given the low volatility of production and the high volatility of
equity observed in the data, the choice of K will have to be a compromise between both. I
choose 7%, consistent with an instantaneous volatility of production of 2:8%. The resulting
volatility of stock returns of 7% is admitedly low, but it can be defended by noting that
we observe levered equity, whereas in this model the appropriate volatility is the one of
unlevered equity. Equity volatility of 7% is consistent with leverage slightly larger than
50%.14. Typical assumptions for capital intensity are between 30% and 40%, and I use
40% as the benchmark case. I choose the coecient of relative risk aversion,  (13), and
the elasticity of intertemporal substitution,   (1.1), to match the risk-free rate and the
market's Sharpe ratio and following other work using Epstein-Zin preferences. A relatively
high value for  ensures a high Sharpe ratio, whereas a low value for   produces low
risk-free rates.
The depreciation rate  and capital's intensity  have a large impact on the ratio of
wages to consumption. Lower capital intensities are associated with higher ratios of wages
to consumption and higher weights of human capital in the aggregate wealth portfolio.
Higher depreciation rates have the same eect, increasing wages over consumption and
the weight of human capital in the aggregate wealth portfolio. These variables do not
signicantly aect the other moments of the model. I choose  and  to match the ratio
of wages to consumption. The resulting parameter for  is .06, which implies that capital
investments have a half-life of roughly 11.5 years, and is common in the macroeconomics
literature.
5.2 Results
The calibration provides several key insights. First, the ratio of wages to consumption is
counter-cyclical, explaining why human capital is less risky than equity. Second, the size
and risk of human capital are a function of the ratio of wages to consumption. Third,
asset-prices change depending on the state of the economy. These results are discussed in
14Danthine and Donaldson (2002) use a similar argument to justify equity volatility of 12%
26more detail below.
Using the parameters discussed in the previous section, Table 2 summarizes the values
around which each of the variables mean-reverts. The risk-free rate of 1.7% is lower than
the historical average. Equity excess returns are about 3.3% and instantaneous equity
volatility is 7%. The resulting Sharpe ratio is .44. Equity's volatility is about two times
higher than the volatility of consumption growth, which is 3.9%.
5.2.1 Consumption and output
First, we look at the ratio of consumption to capital. In the simple constant expected-
returns model (for example, see Merton (1971)) consumption is a constant fraction of
capital. In the economy analyzed here, consumption is adjusting as shocks change expected
returns, resulting in a time-varying consumption to capital ratio. Figure 1 shows that the
ratio of consumption to capital increases as a function of output per unit of capital. Since
output per unit of capital increases after negative shocks, or at times in which future
consumption growth is high, this result implies that consumption as a fraction of capital
increases in \bad times."15
Next, we study the ratio of consumption to output. Figure 2 shows that this ratio
decreases as output per unit of capital increases. In other words, the agent invests relatively
more when the output for a given level of capital increases. This result is not surprising,
since the agent's opportunity cost of consuming today increases when output per unit of
capital is relatively high. Figure 2 also shows the ratio of wages to output. A property of the
Cobb-Douglas production function is that this ratio is constant. As a result, consumption
falls relative to wages when output per unit of capital increases. Output per unit of capital
increases after shocks leave consumption below its long term value. These are times of
relatively high marginal utility, implying that consumption falls more than wages after
when the representative ageng is relatively \hungry". This is the key result explaining
why human capital is less risky than equity in this model.
15Note that even though the ratio of consumption to capital increases in \bad" times, the absolute level
of consumption falls, relative to its long run trend, in \bad times".
27To vizualize the previous result, gure 3 presents the ratio of wages to consumption
as a function of output per unit of capital. The gure shows that the ratio of wages
to consumption increases with output per unit of capital. Because output per unit of
capital is high when the representative agent is relatively \hungry", this gure stresses the
counter-cyclical movement of wages relative to consumption.
5.2.2 Human capital and equity returns
Figures 4 and 5 show how large and how risky human capital is. Unconditionally, human
capital is 87% of aggregate wealth, and, at 2.3%, its expected excess return is about two
thirds of equity's expected excess return. The weight of human capital in aggregate wealth
is close to the fraction of wages to consumption, which has an unconditional value of 85%.
Furthermore, the weight of human capital in aggregate wealth follows closely, and remains
above, the ratio of wages to consumption.
Figure 5 shows the relationship between the ratio of wages to consumption and excess
returns. Higher-than-average ratios of wages to consumption will be associated with higher-
than-average contemporaneous excess returns. Equity's expected excess return is 3.3%
and its volatility is 7%, as shown in gure 6. These values are driven by the \smoothing"
induced by time-varying expected returns in the agent's consumption.
Besides human capital's size and expected return, Figure 7 shows the relationship
between the covariance of aggregate wages growth and equity, and the covariance between
human capital and equity. Throughout a wide range of values for production per unit
of capital, including the steady-state, the covariance between human capital returns and
equity returns is more than twice the covariance between wage growth and equity returns.
This result is relevant for asset-pricing tests and portfolio selection problems. After
Mayer's (1972) result linking optimal portfolios and asset prices to aggregate wages growth,
several papers (Fama and Schwert (1977), Heaton and Lucas (1996)), documented that
since the observed covariance between wages growth and equity returns was small, the
eect of human capital on asset-prices was small. But the model presented here shows
28that the covariance of human capital and equity returns is not equal to the covariance
between wages growth and equity returns, with the covariance between human capital
returns and equity returns appearing larger.
6 Conclusion
This paper explores the implications of a general equilibrium production model for the
value and dynamics of human capital. Decreasing returns to scale and the sharing of
consumption between labor and capital drive the results. The calibrated model predicts
mean-reverting risk premia, dividend yields, and interest rates, with labor income growth
and capital returns cointegrated over time.
The model suggests that human capital is less exposed to production shocks than
equity. This result does not rely on frictions of labor markets such as labor contracts
that protect workers from idiosyncratic productivity shocks. Instead, it follows from wages
being a larger fraction of consumption in \bad times", so that owners of a human capital
claim hold a natural hedge against unfavorable outcomes in the economy.
An empirical construction of the returns to human capital based on this model is
better at explaining the cross-section of asset returns than labor income growth. This
result opens the possibility for other tests that can be performed with this measure of the
returns to human capital.
The model can be extended in multiple directions. An obvious one is allowing the
fraction of output received by workers to change over time. Acemoglu (2002) presents
a model grounded on new growth models from which the fraction of output received by
capital is mean-reverting. Alternatively, even though capital intensity remains constant,
the realized fraction could change due to \sticky" wages, for example due to the existence
of adjustment costs. A richer model in which the fraction of output that goes to workers
changes over time can magnify the \leverage" eect that wages have on dividends, as
long as the fraction increases when consumption decreases. While in the present model
29uncertainty aligns the interests of investors and workers, translating into larger payos for
both as technology changes, they are confronted by variations in the share of output they
each receive. A larger pie benets both stake holders, but the way the pie is divided clearly
benets one stakeholder at the expense of the other. Finding a way to separate these two
eects is an extension that could help enhance our understanding of variations in labor
income and asset returns.
Another extension is to consider heterogeneity in worker's skills and the inclusion of
the dynamics of human capital accumulation. Distinguishing labor by its skill, and letting
agents choose their level of skill could provide insights into our understanding of investments
in human capital. Likewise, the model can be generalized to include demographic changes
that would provide a link from intergenerational change to asset prices.
Finally, the role played by a competitive wage across dierent industries potentially
aects the cross-section of asset returns. A positive technology shock in one industry
will increase the demand for labor in that industry, which in turn increases economy-wide
wages, aecting the returns in all other industries. Thus, labor markets play a signicant
role in the riskiness of rms' cash ows, and understanding that role better can improve
our specication of the cross-section of asset returns.
30References
Acemoglu, D. (2003). Labor- and capital-augmenting technological change. Journal of
European Economic Association 1, 1{37.
Baxter, M. and U. Jermann (1997). The international diversication puzzle is worse than
you think. American Economic Review 87(1), 170{180.
Belo, F. (2006). A pure production-based asset pricing model. Working paper, University
of Minnesota.
Benzoni, L., P. Collin-Dufresne, and R. Goldstein (2007). Portfolio choice over the life cy-
cle when the stock and labor markets are cointegrated. The Journal of Finance 62(5),
2123{2167.
Boldrin, M., L. Christiano, and J. Fisher (2001). Habit persistence, asset returns, and
the business cycle. American Economic Review 91(1), 149{166.
Bourguignon, F. (1974). A particular class of continuous-time stochastic growth models.
Journal of Economic Theory 9, 141{158.
Breeden, D. (1979). An intertemporal asset pricing model with stochastic consumption
and investment opportunities. Journal of Financial Economics 7, 265{296.
Brock, W. (1982). Asset prices in a production economy, in Economics of Information
and Uncertainty, J.J. McCall, ed., University of Chicago Press, 1-43.
Brock, W. and L. Mirman (1972). Optimal economic growth and uncertainty: The
discounted case. Journal of Economic Theory 4(3), 479{513.
Campbell, J. (1996). Understanding risk and return. The Journal of Political Econ-
omy 104(2), 298{345.
Campbell, J. and J. Cochrane (1999). By force of habit: A consumption-based expla-
nation of aggregate stock market behavior. Journal of Political Economy 107(2),
205{251.
31Campbell, J. and L. Viceira (1999). Consumption and portfolio decisions when expected
returns are time varying. Quarterly Journal of Economics 114(2), 433{495.
Chen, X., J. Favilukis, and S. Ludvigson (2008). An Estimation of Economic Models
with Recursive Preferences. Working paper, New York University.
Cochrane, J. (1991). Production-based asset pricing and the link between stock returns
and economic uctuations. Journal of Finance 46(1), 209{237.
Cochrane, J. (1996). A cross-sectional test of an investment-based asset pricing model.
Journal of Political Economy 104(3), 572{621.
Cochrane, J., F. Longsta, and P. Santa-Clara (2006). Two trees. Review of Financial
Studies 21(1), 347{385.
Cox, J. and C. Huang. Optimal consumption and portfolio policies when asset prices
follow a diusion process. Journal of Economic theory 49, 33{83.
Danthine, J. and J. Donaldson (2002). Labour relations and asset returns. Review of
Economic Studies 69(1), 41{64.
Danthine, J., J. Donaldson, and R. Mehra (1992). The equity premium and the allocation
of income risk. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 16(3), 509{532.
Davis, S. and P. Willen (2000). Risky labor income and portfolio choice. Working paper.
Duee, G. (2005). Time variation in the covariance between stock returns and consump-
tion growth. The Journal of Finance 60(4), 1673{1712.
Due, D. and L. Epstein (1992a). Asset pricing with stochastic dierential utility. Re-
view of Financial Studies 5(3), 411{436.
Due, D. and L. Epstein (1992b). Stochastic dierential utility. Econometrica 60(2),
353{394.
Due, D. and C. Skiadas (1994). Continuous-time security pricing: a utility gradient
approach. Journal of Mathematical Economics 23(2), 107{132.
32Epstein, L. and S. Zin (1989). Substitution, risk aversion, and the temporal behavior of
consumption and asset returns: A theoretical framework. Econometrica: Journal of
the Econometric Society 57(4), 937{969.
Fama, E. (1990). Stock returns, expected returns, and real activity. Journal of Fi-
nance 45(4), 1089{1108.
Fama, E. and K. French (1989). Business conditions and expected returns on stocks and
bonds. Journal of Financial Economics 25(1), 23{49.
Fama, E. and W. Schwert (1977). Human capital and capital market equilibrium. Journal
of Financial Economics 4(1), 95{125.
Gomes, J., L. Kogan, and M. Yogo (2007). Durability of output and expected stock
returns. NBER working paper W12986.
Harris, M. and B. Holmstrom (1982). A theory of wage dynamics. The Review of Eco-
nomic Studies 49(3), 443{487.
Heaton, J. and D. Lucas (1996). Evaluating the Eects of Incomplete Markets on Risk
Sharing and Asset Pricing. The Journal of Political Economy 104(3), 443{487.
Heaton, J. and D. Lucas (2000). Portfolio choice and asset prices: the importance of
entrepreneurial risk. The Journal of Finance 55(3), 1163{1198.
Jagannathan, R. and Z. Wang (1996). The conditional CAPM and the cross-section of
expected returns. The Journal of Finance 51(1), 3{53.
Jermann, U. (1998). Asset pricing in production economies. Journal of Monetary Eco-
nomics 41(2), 257{275.
Jorgenson, D. and B. Fraumeni (1989). The accumulation of human and nonhuman
capital, 1948-84, in The Measurement of Saving, Investment, and Wealth, R.E. Lipsy
and H.S. Tice, eds., University of Chicago Press, 227-282.
Julliard, C. (2007). Labor income risk and asset returns. Working paper.
33Koo, H. K. (1998). Consumption and portfolio selection with labor income: A
continuous-time approach. Mathematial Finance 8(1), 49{65.
Kreps, D. and E. Porteus (1978). Temporal resolution of uncertainty and dynamic choice
theory. Econometrica 46(1), 185{200.
Lamont, O. (1998). Earnings and expected returns. The Journal of Finance 53(5), 1563{
1587.
Lettau, M. and S. Ludvigson (2001a). Consumption, aggregate wealth, and expected
stock returns. The Journal of Finance 56(3), 815{849.
Lettau, M. and S. Ludvigson (2001b). Resurrecting the (c)capm: A cross-sectional test
when risk premia are time-varying. The Journal of Political Economy 109(6), 1238{
1286.
Lucas, R. (1978). Asset prices in an exchange economy. Econometrica 46(6), 1429{1445.
Lustig, H. and S. Van Nieuwerburgh (2008). The returns on human capital: Good news
on wall street is bad news on main street. Review of Financial Studies 21(5), 2097{
2137.
Lustig, H., S. Van Nieuwerburgh, and A. Verdelhan (2010). The wealth-consumption
ratio. Working Paper, UCLA.
Marimon, R. and A. Scott (1999). Computational Methods for the Study of Dynamic
Economies. Oxford University Press.
Mayers, D. (1972). Non-marketable assets and capital market equilibrium under un-
certainty, in Studies in the Theory of Capital Markets, M.C. Jensen, ed., Praeger,
223-248.
Mehra, R. and E. Prescott (1985). The equity premium. Journal of Monetary Eco-
nomics 15(2), 145{61.
Merton, R. (1971). Optimum consumption and portfolio rules in a continuous-time
model. Journal of Economic Theory 3(4), 373{413.
34Merton, R. (1973). An intertemporal capital asset pricing model. The Journal of Finan-
cial Econometrics 1(2), 272{289.
Merton, R. (1975). An asymptotic theory of growth under uncertainty. Review of Eco-
nomic Studies 42(3), 375{393.
Mirrlees, J. (1967). Optimum growth when technology is changing. Review of Economic
Studies 34(1), 95{124.
Palacios-Huerta, I. (2003a). An empirical analysis of the risk properties of human capital
returns. American Economic Review 93(3), 948{964.
Palacios-Huerta, I. (2003b). The robustness of the conditional CAPM with human cap-
ital. Journal of Financial Econometrics 1(2), 272{289.
Ramsey, F. (1928). A mathematical theory of saving. Economic Journal 38(152), 543{
559.
Rouwenhorst, K. (1995). Asset pricing implications of equilibrium business cycle models.
Frontiers of Business Cycle Research, 294{330.
Santos, T. and P. Veronesi (2006). Labor income and predictable stock returns. Review
of Financial Studies 19(1), 1{44.
Shiller, R. (1995). Aggregate income risks and hedging mechanisms. The Quarterly Re-
view of Economics and Finance 35(2), 119{152.
Smith, W. (2007). Inspecting the mechanism exactly: A closed-form solution to a
stochastic growth model. The BE Journal of Macroeconomics 7(1).
Svensson, L. (1988). Portfolio choice and asset pricing with nontraded assets. NBER
Working Paper 2774.
Tallarini, T. (2000). Risk-sensitive real business cycles. Journal of Monetary Eco-
nomics 45(3), 507{532.
Viceira, L. (2001). Optimal portfolio choice for long-horizon investors with nontradable
labor income. The Journal of Finance 56(2), 433{470.
357 Appendix A: Symbols and variables
Variable Description
 Capital intensity.
A Eciency parameter in technology function
C Consumption





d Dividends per unit of capital
 Depreciation rate
'K;A Correlation between technology and capital shocks
 Coecient of risk aversion
J Manager's value function
K Aggregate capital
L Aggregate Labor
S Value of equity
e Value of equity per unit of capital
H Value of human capital
h Value of human capital per unit of capital
  Elasticity of Intertemporal Subsitution
 Subjective discount rate
re Expected return of equity
rh Expected return of human capital
rf Risk free rate
A Volatility of technology shocks
K Volatility of output shocks
C Volatility of consumption
e Volatility of of equity
Y Labor income
y Labor income per unit of capital
Z Output per unit of capital
z 1
1  logZ
368 Appendix B: Proofs
8.1 Proof of proposition 1
I start with the central planner's problem. Then, I solve for the manager's problem and
show that it yields the same result as the central planner's problem.




















    1): (37)
Given the innite-horizon setting, the solution will be time-independent. Due and SKi-
adas (1994) show that the solution to this problem can be solved using the traditional HJB
equations, such that:

























The structure of the problem suggests that J is homogeneous and, given the innite-





37Calculating the FOC w.r.t. c and substituting the guess for J(K;z), we obtain










Next, replacing our guess for J(K;z) in equation (39), and noticing that K drops out of
the equation, we obtain the following ODE for the function g(z):
0 = g(z)(1   )
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If a solution for g(z) exists that satises equations (41) and (42), then our guess will be
a solution to the central planner's problem. To verify that our candidate value function
is indeed an optimal solution, we need to verify that the transversality condition holds.
Numerical solutions imply the condition is satised, but I omit a formal proof here.
Now, nd the solution to the competitive equilibrium. Following Cox and Huang













Ms(Ys   Cs)ds; (44)
where Mt is the stochastic discount factor. Taking the FOC w.r.t C, we nd:
Mt = fC(Ct;Vt)i (45)
Where i is the lagrangian multiplier associated with agent i's optimization problem.
38Firms have managers that take the stochastic discount factor Mt, wages Yt, aggregate
capital's level (Kt) and dynamics (K;t, K) as given, and maximize the present value for











s:t: dKj;t = Kj(Z(Kj;t;Lj;t;At)   Lj;tyt   dt)dt + KjKdBt
The rm's problem can be solved with dynamic programming. Dening the value
function J(Kj;t;At;Kt;t), the HJB of the rm's manager is:
0 = sup
Lj;t;dj;t










































Using Equation (47), and noting that the demand for labor Lj;t only appears in the








































Plugging into the rm's optimal demand for labor and back in the production function and
taking into account depreciation, the dynamics of prots for rm j are:















Now we guess that the stochastic discount factor is only a function of aggregate
capital Kt and the technology level At and time. Thus, from the rm's FOC we nd that
the value function for the manager is:
J(Kj;t;At;Kt;t) = Kj;tM(At;Kt;t) (56)
Substituting into the HJB, noticing that the term with the dividend cancels out, and
noticing that Kj;t drops out of the equation we nd:







































40Since all rms are subject to the same production shock, Kj = K. Also, note
that Kj drops out of Equation (57), and we are left with an PDE that depends only on
aggregate capital Kt, the technology level A and time. The solution to this PDE is the
function for M, the stochastic discount factor, and the system will be solved. To continue
with the solution, we guess that Mt = K
 
t m(zt)b(t), where  =
R
n ndn. Substituting in
the previous equation, using equation 16), rearranging terms, and noticing that Kt drops
from the equation, we nd the ODE for the function m(zt),
0 = m(z)

(1   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1    
 
1    
1    
g(z)
 1c(z)m(z) + e































The \no free-disposal" condition implies that consumption equals wages plus divi-
dends. This implies that the drift of aggregate capital is:
Kt = Kte
(1 )zt   Ct   Kt (59)
Thus, Equation (58) becomes:
0 = m(z)

(1   ) 
1    
 
1   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If the function m(z) exists, then it simultaneously solves the manager's and agent's
optimization problems. To verify that our candidate value function is indeed an optimal
41solution, we need to verify that the transversality condition holds. Numerical solutions
suggest the condition is satised, but I omit a formal proof here.
8.2 Proof of proposition 2
I drop the subscript t where possible when it is not needed for clarity. The discounted














The state variable zt and the stock of productive capital Kt describe the economy, and so
the value of human capital will only be a function of these two variables. Taking advantage
of the homogeneity of the model, we guess that H(Kt;zt) = Kth(zt). Using this denition,
and recalling that Mt = K
 
t m(zt)b(t), we can express 8.2 as:
K
1 
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Applying It^ o-Doeblin's Lemma and taking expectations to the expression on the left hand
side we obtain the following expression for the discounted process' drift:
E[dK1 m(z)h(z)]
K1 m(z)h(z)


















42Equating both sides, the dierential equation can be simplied to:
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If the function h(zt) exists, then it will satisfy Equations (64) and (66), and H(Kt;zt) =
Kth(zt) is the arbitrage-free price of a claim to human capital.
Repeating the same process for a claim that pays aggregate dividends, the dierential
equation yields St = Kt as a solution. Thus Kt is the value of a claim to equity in this
economy.
9 Appendix C: Numerical solution method
The three ordinary dierential equations (the rst one solves for the function g(z), the
second one for m(z), and the third one for h(z)) are found using the same method. I use
the nite-dierence Crank-Nicholson method as described in Marimon and Scott (1999)
(chapter 8).
I rst solve the ODE for the value function, using a grid of 1001 points for z ranging
from -40 to 5, a wide range that captures the area of interest. The initial value is found
from the closed-form solution when z ! 0. The initial guess is very important for the
algorithm's convergence. I iterate until the maximum percent change for any given point
is less than 1E-6.
Solving the ODE for the value of equity requires the value of g(z) and m(z) as inputs.
The initial guess is with h(z) = 0, corresponding to the limit of h(z) as z !  1. I iterate
until the maximum percent change between iterations is less than 1E-6.
43Table I
Parameters used in calibration
This table shows the parameters used to calibrate the model. Section 5 describes the choice
of each parameter in more detail.
Variable Symbol Value
Coecient of relative risk aversion  13
Intertemporal elasticity of substitution   1.1
Subjective discount rate  .02
Production shocks volatility K 7%
Productivity shocks volatility A 2.5%
Correlation between production and productivity shocks 'K;A 0%
Productivity growth  1.7%
Capital intensity  .40
Depreciation rate  .06
44Table II
Long-term trend values
This table records the values around which variables mean-revert in the calibration. Data
on the risk-free rate, the risk-free premium, consumption growth volatility, equity volatility,
and the Sharpe ratio is as reported in Campbell and Cochrane's (1999) long sample. The
ratio of wages to consumption is the average for the period 1947 - 2007. Wages are equal
to total compensation as reported in the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA)
tables. Consumption is the scaled sum of nondurables and services, also reported in the
NIPA tables.
Variable Model Data
Risk-free rate 1.7% 2.9%
Equity risk premium 3.1% 3.9%
Consumption growth volatility 3.9% 3.8%
Equity volatility 7% 18%
Sharpe ratio 44% 28%
Wages over consumption 85% 85%
Human capital risk premium 2.3% {
Human capital weight in aggregate wealth 87% {
45Table III
Sensitivity analysis
This table shows the sensitivity of the long-term values to changes in the parameters. The
rst three columns are parameters:  is capital's intensity,  is the coecient of relative
risk aversion and K is the volatility of production shocks. The middle columns show the
results for the volatility of consumption growth and the ratio of wages to consumption w=c.
The last columns show the results for the risk-free rate rf, the equity risk premium re
e, the
volatility of equity e, equity's Sharpe ratio, and the excess return to human capital re
hc.
Other parameters in the calibration are k = 0:07,  = 0:017 and  = 0:02.
Parameters Macro variables Asset-prices
  A w/c c rf Sharpe rp;e rp;hc whc
11 0.38 2.5% 0.948 3.9% -0.18% 0.411 2.88% 2.08% 98.3%
11 0.38 3.5% 0.957 4.1% -0.40% 0.415 2.91% 2.02% 99.0%
11 0.38 4.5% 0.969 4.3% -0.67% 0.421 2.95% 1.93% 99.7%
11 0.4 2.5% 0.908 4.0% 0.57% 0.395 2.77% 2.03% 93.7%
11 0.4 3.5% 0.916 4.2% 0.34% 0.400 2.80% 1.97% 94.3%
11 0.4 4.5% 0.928 4.4% 0.04% 0.406 2.84% 1.88% 95.1%
11 0.42 2.5% 0.871 4.1% 1.27% 0.382 2.67% 1.99% 89.6%
11 0.42 3.5% 0.880 4.3% 1.01% 0.386 2.70% 1.93% 90.2%
11 0.42 4.5% 0.891 4.5% 0.69% 0.392 2.75% 1.84% 91.0%
13 0.38 2.5% 0.888 3.8% 0.78% 0.454 3.18% 2.37% 91.5%
13 0.38 3.5% 0.899 4.0% 0.43% 0.462 3.23% 2.30% 92.4%
13 0.38 4.5% 0.913 4.3% -0.01% 0.471 3.30% 2.21% 93.5%
13 0.4 2.5% 0.852 3.9% 1.65% 0.436 3.05% 2.31% 87.4%
13 0.4 3.5% 0.862 4.1% 1.26% 0.444 3.10% 2.24% 88.3%
13 0.4 4.5% 0.876 4.3% 0.78% 0.453 3.17% 2.15% 89.3%
13 0.42 2.5% 0.819 4.0% 2.44% 0.420 2.94% 2.25% 83.8%
13 0.42 3.5% 0.829 4.2% 2.03% 0.428 2.99% 2.19% 84.6%
13 0.42 4.5% 0.843 4.4% 1.51% 0.437 3.06% 2.10% 85.6%
15 0.38 2.5% 0.835 3.7% 2.31% 0.485 3.39% 2.60% 85.3%
15 0.38 3.5% 0.847 3.9% 1.72% 0.496 3.47% 2.54% 86.4%
15 0.38 4.5% 0.863 4.2% 1.02% 0.510 3.57% 2.45% 87.8%
15 0.4 2.5% 0.802 3.8% 3.34% 0.464 3.25% 2.53% 81.7%
15 0.4 3.5% 0.813 4.0% 2.70% 0.475 3.33% 2.47% 82.7%
15 0.4 4.5% 0.829 4.3% 1.94% 0.490 3.43% 2.38% 84.1%
15 0.42 2.5% 0.772 3.9% 4.26% 0.446 3.12% 2.47% 78.4%
15 0.42 3.5% 0.783 4.1% 3.58% 0.458 3.20% 2.41% 79.4%
15 0.42 4.5% 0.798 4.3% 2.75% 0.472 3.30% 2.33% 80.7%
46Figure 1
Consumption per unit of capital as a function of output per unit of capital
Results with the following parameters:  = 0:40,  = 0:02,  = 0:017,  = 13,   = 1:1,
K = 0:07,  = :06. The vertical black line denotes the long-term value around which the
economy oscillates.
Figure 2
Consumption over output as a function of output per unit of capital
Results with the following parameters:  = 0:40,  = 0:02,  = 0:017,  = 13,   = 1:1,
K = 0:07,  = :06. The vertical black line denotes the long-term value around which the
economy oscillates.
47Figure 3
Wages over consumption as a function of output per unit of capital
Results with the following parameters:  = 0:40,  = 0:02,  = 0:017,  = 13,   = 1:1,
K = 0:07,  = :06. The vertical black line denotes the long-term value around which the
economy oscillates.
Figure 4
Human capital as a fraction of the wealth portfolio
Results with the following parameters:  = 0:40,  = 0:02,  = 0:017,  = 13,   = 1:1,
K = 0:07,  = :06. The vertical black line denotes the long-term value around which the
economy oscillates.
48Figure 5
Expected risk premium and as a function of wages over consumption
Results with the following parameters:  = 0:40,  = 0:02,  = 0:017,  = 13,   = 1:1,
K = 0:07,  = :06. The vertical black line denotes the long-term value around which the
economy oscillates.
Figure 6
Consumption and equity volatility as a function of wages over consumption
Results with the following parameters:  = 0:40,  = 0:02,  = 0:017,  = 13,   = 1:1,
K = 0:07,  = :06. The vertical black line denotes the long-term value around which the
economy oscillates.
49Figure 7
Covariance between wages, human capital, and equity returns
Results with the following parameters:  = 0:40,  = 0:02,  = 0:017,  = 13,   = 1:1,
K = 0:07,  = :06. The vertical black line denotes the long-term value around which the
economy oscillates.
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